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Abstract 
 
There is considerable evidence that resources are not allocated randomly within 
households, and that resources are unequally distributed within the family in many 
developing countries.  Such an unequal distribution of goods usually takes the form of a 
bias against females. For example, girls lag markedly behind boys in schooling in many 
developing countries even though this gender gap has been declining in recent years. Using 
an OLS-Robust model and a ML-Random Effects model for the years 1992, 1998 and 2004 
of ENIGH, we did not find enough statistical evidence to support the idea that poor 
families, nether in rural nor in urban areas, provide more education to their 12 to 18 years 
old sons or daughters.  In fact, contrary to the common belief, we found that non-poor 
families, invest more in the education of their daughters, especially in the urban areas. 
However, this education discrimination against male children has been decreasing over the 
years.   It is also found that female head of households are more likely to have children with 
higher levels of schooling and that children having both parents at home or having older 
brothers or sisters present higher levels of educational attainment. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The intra-household allocation of resources has become one of the most important issues in 
human capital research.  There is considerable evidence that resources are not allocated 
randomly within households, and that resources are unequally distributed within the family 
in many developing countries.1  Becker (1965, 1981) conceives the family acting as a single 
decision maker which regards child education as an investment decision. Models of intra-
household allocation of goods that follow Becker´s approach assume the allocation is 
determined in one of the following three ways: i) parents allocate resources based on the 
differential labor market returns to boys and girls (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982); ii) 
parents allocate resources according to their own utility, which depends on the well-being 
of their children (Behrman et al 1982, Behrman 1988); iii) households allocate resources 
based on the productivity of individual members (Pitt et al 1990);  
 
However, several authors have pointed out the limitations of those approaches and 
proposed alternative collective models for the analysis of household behavior.  Those 
models assume resources are allocated according to the relative bargaining power of the 
family members (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, Ulph 1988 and 
1990, Thomas 1990, Haddad and Hoddinott 1991, Chiappori 1992, Lundberg and Pollak 
1993, Wolley 1993, and Echeverria and Merlo 1999). 
 
Such an unequal distribution of goods usually takes the form of a bias against females.  For 
example, Bardhan (1984), Behrman (1988), Harriss (1990), Rosenzweig and Schultz 
(1982), Sen (1984), and Sen and Sengupta (1983) provide evidence, based on mortality 
rates and human capital investments, that gender bias is important in explaining the 
household expenditures on health, nutrition and education among children. Pitt and 
Rosenzweig (1990), Parish and Willis (1993), Quisumbing (1994), and others have also 
worked on the effect of gender bias on investments in childrend´s human capital. 
 
Brinton (1988) developed the concept of human capital system.  In this system, social and 
economic institutions –such as family, educational system and work organization- share the 
responsibilities of human capital development across the individual´s life cycle.  It is 
argued that a cross cultural perspective in gender stratification theory helps understand 
gender stratification in countries with different social, economical and cultural 
characteristics than American ones.  Under this concept, differential parents´ investment in 
sons and daughters is explained by: parents´ perception of sex discrimination by employers, 
parents´ control over resources for investment in children, extent of government support, 
sex preference of parents, female marriage behavior and degree of flexibility in life cycle 
timing human capital development decisions.2  
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Deolalikar (1993) for Indonesia, Parish and Willis (1993) for Taiwan, Schultz (1993) on 
investments in health and education in many groups of developing countries.  Thomas (1990) finds evidence 
of non-random distribution or resources in Brazilian households, and, to a lesser extent, Deaton (1987) and 
Svedberg (1990) find gender bias in Africa.  Haddad et al. (1994) provide an overview of the literature on 
within-household resource allocation. 
2 For instance, Brinton (1988) found that Japan has a system of human capital development that encourages 
greater gender stratification (in favor of male children) than the American system. 
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Furthermore, girls lag markedly behind boys in schooling in many developing countries 
even though this gender gap has been declining in recent years (King and Hill 1993; 
Behrman 1993).  Alderman et al (1996) report that, in 1990, girls tended to receive less 
schooling than boys, particularly in rural areas, low-income countries, and in South Asia.  
According to the World Bank (2005), in 1990, secondary school enrollment in low-income 
countries was 26 percent for girls and 42 percent for boys.3 By 2001, female secondary 
enrollment had increased to 41 percent as compared to 51 percent for male enrollment.4   
 
The existence and sources of gender bias has become highly relevant for the case of 
Mexico where the government has been implementing social programs aimed at the 
reduction of gender inequality under the presumption that there is discrimination against 
girls in education opportunities. Moreover, in 2004, Secretaria de Desarrollo Social 
(SEDESOL) conducted the Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminacion en Mexico 
(First Nacional Survey on Discrimination in Mexico).  It is reported that 15% of the 
respondents think they should not invest in their daughters´ education because they will end 
up getting married.  
 
The aim of this paper is to determine whether there is evidence for differences by gender in 
the allocation of household resources.  We will focus on child education, as measured by 
the number of years of schooling completed.  Using an OLS-Robust model and a ML-
Random Effects model for the years 1992, 1998 and 2004, we did not find enough 
statistical evidence to support the idea that poor families, nether in rural nor in urban areas, 
provide more education to their 12 to 18 years old sons or daughters.  In fact, contrary to 
the common belief, we found that non-poor families, invest more in the education of their 
daughters, especially in the urban areas. Fortunately, this education discrimination against 
male children has been decreasing over the years.   It is also found that female head of 
households are more likely to have children with higher levels of schooling and that 
children having both parents at home or having older brothers of sisters present higher 
levels of educational attainment. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides some background 
on Mexico´s educational gender gaps.  Section III describes de data used and section IV 
specifies the model.  Section V presents the results and section VI concludes the paper . 
 
 
II. Educational Gender Gaps in Mexico 
 
Increasing human capital investments in children is considered to be among the most 
effective ways of encouraging growth and of alleviating poverty in developing countries. 
                                                 
3 Based on gross enrollment ratio which is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of 
the age group that officially corresponds to the level of  secondary education. 
4 Primary school enrollment in 2001 was 72 percent for female and 82 percent for male. 
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To stimulate such investments, many governments in Latin America and Asia have initiated 
programs to provide financial incentives for families to send their children to school.5
 
In 1997, the Mexican government created Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación 
(PROGRESA), which in 2002 became OPORTUNIDADES. This program provides 
focalized aid on education, health and food with the objective of forming human capital in 
the poorest communities and families in Mexico (Parker and Scott 2001).  The aid for 
education takes the form of monetary transfers to families that are contingent upon their 
children´s regular attendance at school.  The transfer amount varies with the child´s grade 
level and is greatest for children in secondary school.  The benefit level is also slightly 
higher for female children who are traditionally thought to have lower secondary school 
enrollment levels.  
 
Notably remarkable is the fact, however, that, according to the World Bank (2005), 
between 1990 and 2001, secondary school enrollment in Mexico has been higher for female 
than for male.  Table 1 shows that, in 1990, this ratio was 54 percent for girls as compared 
to 53 percent for boys.  The gender gap widened by 2001 when secondary enrollment for 
female was 78 percent; 5 percentage points above that for male. 
 
Table 1. School Enrollment by Country Group and Education Level 
 
 1990 2000 2001 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Primary school ¹             
Low income .. .. 82 71 82 72 
Lower middle income 94 90 .. .. 93 93 
Middle income 94 90 .. .. 93 93 
Upper middle income 93 91 92 92 92 92 
Latinamerica & Caribbean 87 86 96 94 .. .. 
Mexico 100 98 99 100 99 100 
              
Secondary school ²             
Low income 42 26 47 36 51 41 
Lower middle income 58 49 72 70 .. .. 
Middle income 58 50 73 71 .. .. 
Upper middle income 58 59 78 81 78 82 
Latinamerica & Caribbean .. .. 81 87 83 89 
Mexico 53 54 72 75 73 78 
              
Terciary school ²             
Low income 13 3 11 7 12 8 
Lower middle income 7 9 .. .. .. .. 
Middle income 10 10 .. .. .. .. 
Upper middle income 11 15 29 36 31 39 
Latinamerica & Caribbean 16 13 20 25 22 26 
Mexico 17 13 21 20 22 21 
Source: World Development Indicators 2005, the World Bank 
¹ Net enrollment ratio.  The ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group 
that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. 
² Gross enrollment ratio.  The ratio of the number of children of official school age (as defined by the 
national education system) who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official 
school age. 
                                                 
5 Such programs exist, for instance, in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Nicaragua, 
and Honduras.  See Berhman, Segupta and Todd (2001). 
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Recently, secondary and high school enrollment in Mexico has been higher for female than 
for men. The gap is particularly higher for high school than for secondary school. This 
observed gap has increased between 2001 and 2004 as shown in table 2. 
 
Literature on sex discrimination in education access in Mexico is limited.6 Lopez (2004) 
used a probit model to analyze determinants of secondary schooling enrollment in Mexico, 
and, in contrast to the aforementioned data about education enrollment, found that being a 
woman reduces the probability to enroll in secondary school, and this effect is even higher 
for rural than urban area. A possible explanation of these findings could be that she used 
data from ENIGH 1984, 1989, 1992 and 1994, thereby reflecting previous information. 
Parker and Pederzini (2001) find that although there seems to be no difference in primary 
school enrollment and overall years of education between male and female children, a 
lower proportion of women attend secondary or tertiary school. 
 
 
Table 2. School Enrollment for Secondary and High School by Sex in Mexico¹ 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Secondary 
School      
Male 61 62 64 65 65 
Female 61 63 64 66 67 
High School      
Male 46 48 50 53 53 
Female 48 51 53 55 57 
Source: Calculations based on data from Información Estadística. Instituto Nacional de Geografía, 
Estadística e Informática, INEGI and Proyecciones de la Población de México 2000-2050. 
Consejo Nacional de Población, CONAPO (2003) 
¹ The ratio of the number of children of official school age (as defined by the national education 
system) who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. 
 
 
III.  Data 
 
We use data from the Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto (ENIGH) for the waves 1992, 
1998 and 2004. The ENIGH is a national income expenditure survey that emerged in 1984. 
However, it was in 1992 when the survey start to be conducted on a regularly basis 
(biennially). This database is statistically representative for Mexico and contains detailed 
information of households for several measures of income and expenditure, socio-
demographic characteristics of every member in the household such as age, education level, 
and characteristics of the job. The ENIGH also contains information of the physical 
characteristics of the dwelling. This national survey uses houses as sample units and 
households as units of observation.  
 
The purpose to use data for the waves 1992, 1998 and 2004 is to compare the evolution of 
observable and unobservable factors that might generate differences in education 
                                                 
6 There is, on the other hand, plentiful literature on sex discrimination in the labor market in Mexico.  See, for 
instance, Camero (1995), Valdez (1995), Mayer and Cordourier (2001), and Sariñana (2002).  
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opportunities between boys and girls in three different points in time. We know that the 
best way to perform this kind of analysis is to use panel data and follow the same 
individuals throw the time. However, we do no have this kind of data source for Mexico.  
 
The original data contained 50,862 individuals from 10,530 households for 1992, 48,110 
individuals from 10,952 households for 1998 and 91,378 individuals from 22,595 
households for 2004. We decided to drop domestic workers, temporal visitors and heads of 
households absent. As a result, the size of the database decreases to 50,378 observations 
from 10,530 households for 1992, 47,581 observations from 10,952 households for 1998 
and 91,450 observations from 22,595 for 2004. Additionally, from the sample of 
individuals we selected only children between 12 and 18 years old in order to avoid 
possible bias in the selection of the sample.7   These restrictions led to a total of 7,623 
children in the 1992 ENIGH aged between 12 and 18 with valid responses for all the 
variables employed in this research. In 1998, a total 6,871 children met the age 
requirements and had valid responses. Finally, in 2004, a total of 11,109 children aged 
between 12 and 18 and had valid responses.   
 
Before starting the descriptive analysis of the data it is necessary to first define the 
variables used in this research. Table 3 below presents a complete list of the variables 
employed in this research and its definitions. Most of the definitions are very transparent 
and do not need further explanation with the exception of rural and poor. We consider that 
an individual lives in a rural area if (s)he lives in a town with a population smaller than 
2,500 habitants.  Additionally, a household is classified as poor if it has a quarterly per 
capita income lower than $2,170.82 (measured in 2002 pesos) for urban areas. For rural 
areas, a household is classified as poor if it has a quarterly per capita income lower than 
$1,615.75 (measured in 2002 pesos).8
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the data. The second column presents the mean 
values for all the individuals in the sample, the third and fourth column show the mean 
values for boys and girls respectively. The last column contains the difference in means 
between girls and boys. The figures presented in parentheses represent the standard 
deviation for each variable and the figures in the squared brackets (in the last column) 
represent the t statistic for the difference in means. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Women usually get married earlier than men. Therefore, we decided not to include children older than 18 
because we will end with a smaller number of women and men in the sample. Additionally, because of the 
same fact we might end with a biased sample of more educated women. 
8 This is the definition employed by the Mexican Technical Committee for Measuring Poverty (Comité 
Técnico de Medición de la Pobreza (2002)). It is worth mentioning that, in order to estimate this line of 
poverty, the Mexican Technical Committee for Measuring Poverty uses a different definition of rural area. 
They consider a household as rural if it is located in a population smaller than 15,000 habitants and for the 
construction of this variable we use the same definition. 
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Table 3. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Education Years of education of child 
head education Years of education of the head of the household 
Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 if the child is boy and zero otherwise 
Poor Dummy variable equal to 1 if the child lives in a poor household and zero 
otherwise 
hours worked Weekly hours worked by the child 
child order Equal to the birth order of the child divided by the total number of children 
in the family 
Rural Dummy variable equal to 1 if the child lives in a rural area and zero 
otherwise 
Age Age of the child 
both parents Dummy variable equal to 1 if the two parents are present in the household 
and zero otherwise 
gender x rural Equal to the interaction between gender and rural 
gender x poor Equal to the interaction between gender and poor 
State dummies We include state dummy variables as controls 
 
 
The data shows that girls had 0.25 more years of education than boys in 1992. Additionally, 
it is possible to observe a statistically significant difference of 9 hours between the number 
of hours worked weekly by boys and girls in that year.  It is also identified a slightly higher 
proportion (0.03) of boys in poverty compared to girls.  The rest of the variables in the 
sample of 1992 do not present any statistically significant difference between the two 
groups analyzed. On the other hand, in 1998, girls had, on average, 0.20 years of education 
more than boys. In addition, the data for this year shows that, compared to girls, a slightly 
higher proportion of boys lived in households where the head of the family is a man. 
Moreover, boys worked on average 1.87 hours per week more than girls. The rest of the 
variables for 1998 do not present any statistically significant difference between boys and 
girls. For 2004, the data shows that the difference in years of education between girls and 
boys is equal to 0.15 in favor of girls.  The data shows that, on average, boys work 5.72 
hours a week more than girls and that boys are 0.12 years older than girls in the year 2004. 
No other statistically significant difference between the two groups analyzed was found in 
the 2004 sample.  
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
1992     
Variable All Boys Girls Difference in Means 
Education 6.64 
(2.35) 
6.52 
(2.37) 
6.77 
(2.32) 
0.25* 
[4.53] 
head education 5.01 
(3.74) 
4.99 
(3.70) 
5.03 
(3.78) 
0.054 
[0.63] 
head gender 0.86 
(0.34) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
0.86 
(0.35) 
-0.007 
[-0.93] 
Poor 0.39 
(0.49) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.40 
(0.49) 
0.03 
[2.37] 
hours worked 10.30 
(19.89) 
14.66 
(22.36) 
5.59 
(15.51) 
-9.06* 
[-20.70] 
child order 0.56 
(0.27) 
0.56 
(0.27) 
0.57 
(0.27) 
0.009 
[1.45] 
Rural 0.45 
(0.50) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
-0.01 
[-1.18] 
Age 14.83 
(2.01) 
14.87 
(2.03) 
14.79 
(1.99) 
-0.08 
[-1.74] 
both parents 0.89 
(0.31) 
0.89 
(0.31) 
0.89 
(0.32) 
-0.005 
[-0.69] 
1998     
Education 7.08 
(2.35) 
6.98 
(2.38) 
7.18 
(2.32) 
0.20* 
[3.55] 
head education 5.43 
(4.33) 
5.36 
(4.34) 
5.52 
(4.32) 
0.15 
[1.47] 
head gender 0.84 
(0.36) 
0.84 
(0.36) 
0.82 
(0.38) 
-0.02* 
[2.50] 
Poor 0.48 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
-0.002 
[-0.17] 
hours worked 1.61 
(10.08) 
2.53 
(12.66) 
0.66 
(6.28) 
-1.87* 
[-7.81] 
child order 0.59 
(0.28) 
0.59 
(0.28) 
0.60 
(0.28) 
0.003 
[0.59] 
Rural 0.41 
(0.49) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.40 
(0.49) 
-0.02 
[-1.77] 
Age 14.81 
(1.99) 
14.82 
(1.99) 
14.78 
(1.99) 
-0.04 
[-0.77] 
both parents 0.87 
(0.34) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
0.86 
(0.38) 
-0.005 
[-0.68] 
2004     
Education 7.63 
(2.33) 
7.56 
(2.33) 
7.71 
(2.33) 
0.15* 
[2.33] 
head education 6.72 
(4.61) 
6.73 
(4.66) 
6.72 
(4.57) 
-0.008 
[-0.09] 
head gender 0.81 
(0.39) 
0.81 
(0.39) 
0.82 
(0.39) 
0.006 
[0.93] 
Poor 0.31 
(0.46) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.004 
[0.50] 
hours worked 7.84 
(17.22) 
10.62 
(19.33) 
4.90 
(14.07) 
-5.72* 
[-18.34] 
child order 0.63 
(0.28) 
0.63 
(0.28) 
0.63 
(0.28) 
-0.0009 
[-0.18] 
Rural 0.29 
(0.45) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
-0.004 
[-0.52] 
Age 14.84 
(1.99) 
14.90 
(2.01) 
14.77 
(1.97) 
-0.12* 
[-3.45] 
both parents 0.82 
(0.38) 
0.82 
(0.38) 
0.83 
(0.38) 
0.009 
[1.35] 
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IV.  Model Specification  
 
The aim of this study is to explain the differences in schooling between female and male 
children within a family and, specifically, if there exists gender bias during the allocation 
process.  In order to do this, we estimate equations of the form 
 
ijiijiij uZXEdu ++++= δβββ 210                                      (1)               
 
where Eduij is the number of years of formal education completed by child j in family i. Xi 
is a vector of variables which are common to all family members (we include 
characteristics of the head of family such as gender and education, as well as family 
characteristics such as the presence of both parents in the household, rural or urban location 
of the household, the number of children, and whether the family is classified as poor 
according to their income). We also include dummy variables to control for cultural and 
other (regional) unobserved differences between the states of residence of the families.  Zij 
is a vector of variables which vary across family members (such as gender, age, child birth 
order, and hours worked, if applicable). Interactions between gender and rural/urban status 
and between gender and poverty status are included to investigate to which extent gender 
bias is influenced by each of these conditions.  The error term is assumed to have two 
components: one common to all children within a family, δi, and another which varies 
independently across siblings, uij.   
 
First, following Parish and Willis (1993), the models are estimated applying 
heteroskedasticity-robust methods (Eicker 1967, Huber 1967, and White 1980).  That is, we 
deal with the issue that errors in the equations are not independent because of the common 
unmeasured family effect, δi, by estimating robust standard errors.9   
 
Unobservable preferences, however, may influence both the family characteristics and the 
allocation of resources to children.10  The instrumental variable approach normally used to 
solve this problem is not  feasible in this case because all of the exogenous variables are 
contained in the model, leaving no instruments available to identify the family effect.  
Instead, we could estimate fixed- and random-effect models that control for the possible 
correlation between the regressors and the disturbance. 
 
A limitation of the fixed-effect model is that we cannot estimate 1β , the coefficients of the 
variables common to all siblings.  Additionally, as Griliches (1979) emphasizes, the within 
estimators are not necessarily closer to the “true” estimators because differentiating may 
exacerbate the effects of other potential econometric problems such as measurement errors 
in explanatory variables or endogeneity involving the individual error component. 
 
                                                 
9 We do not know whether robust standard errors will be larger than usual standard errors ahead of time.  
However, as an empirical matter, the robust standard errors are often found to be larger than the usual 
standard errors. (Wooldridge 2003, p. 261) 
10 For example, high fertility families may choose to invest less in the education of each child, leading to a 
negative correlation between δi and the number of siblings, which, in turn, leads to correlations with related 
variables such as relative birth order. 
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On the other hand, one can think of the unobserved effect to be uncorrelated with all 
explanatory variables, whether these variables are fixed across a family or not.  In this 
sense, a child´s education is explained by his own characteristics as well as his family´s 
background, but there is an unobserved effect that varies randomly within and across 
families.  Thus, we can include in a child´s education equation a variable such as head of 
family´s education even if it does not change across siblings.  But we are assuming that 
head of family´s education is uncorrelated with the unobserved effect, which contains other 
family  and child characteristics (see Wooldridge 2003, pp. 469-71).   
 
Therefore, we estimate also equation 1 assuming random effects with the following 
specification in the error terms 
 
µij ∼ N(0, σ2µ)                 (2) 
 
δi ∼ N(0, σ2δ)                  (3) 
 
E(µij δi) = E((δj δk) = 0 (i≠k)                                      (4) 
 
E(µij µis) = E(µij µkj) = E(µij µks) (i ≠k; j≠s)                (5) 
 
Cov (Xi, δi) = Cov (Zij, δi) = 0                                   (6) 
 
 
Notice that in the random effect model β1 represents the mean value of all the intersections 
and δi represents the (random) deviation from the mean value of the individual intersection. 
However, δi is not directly observable and for that reason the error wij (equal to µij + δi) is 
heteroskedastik (σ2w = σ2µ + σ2δ) and, therefore, is not appropriate to use Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) to estimate this equation. 
 
 
V. Results 
 
Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the two models considered 
(OLS-Robust and ML-Random Effects) for the years 1992, 1998 and 2004. Each year was 
estimated independently. The OLS-Robust model presents less significant coefficients than 
the ML-RE model. However, both models report similar results. As noted, we include in 
our regressions children between 12 and 18 years old having at least one parent at home. In 
order to investigate whether families discriminate among the education given to their 
daughters and sons, depending on their rural or urban status and their economic (poor or 
non-poor) condition, we include the interaction between the variables gender and rural and 
gender and poor. 
 
With the inclusion of these interaction variables, the coefficient of the variable gender 
inquires only into the existence of gender discrimination on education within non-poor 
urban families (i.e. poor=0 and rural=0). A negative sign indicates that, after controlling by 
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other individual and family characteristics, non-poor urban boys expect to achieve less 
years of schooling than non-poor urban girls.  
 
In our regressions, the coefficient for the variable gender is negative and significant in all 
cases. In 1992, the OLS-Robust model reports that, within non-poor urban families, boys 
have in average 0.3564 years of schooling less than girls. In 1998, this number decreased to 
0.3003 years and by 2004, education discrimination against boys within non-poor urban 
families decreased to only 0.1654 years. The ML-RE model reports slightly smaller 
coefficient estimates than the OLS-Robust model. In 1992, non-poor urban boys had 
0.3382 years of schooling less than non-poor urban girls; in 1998, this number decreased to 
0.2646 years; and, by 2004, this estimate decreased to 0.1458 years.  
 
The sum of the coefficients of the variables gender and the interaction variable gender x 
rural allow us to inquire whether non-poor rural families (i.e. poor=0 and rural=1) 
discriminate among the education given to their female and male children (the sum of the 
coefficients and standard errors are reported in table 6). The OLS-Robust model estimates 
that, in 1992, non-poor rural boys obtained 0.3847 years of schooling less than non-poor 
rural girls. However, in 1998, gender discrimination on education within non-poor rural 
families became statistically not significant. The ML-RE model reports very similar results. 
In 2004, the ML-RE model reports, with statistical significance, that non-poor rural boys 
get 0.2505 years of schooling less than non-poor rural girls. In general, we can affirm 
statistically that non-poor families, especially in the urban areas, discriminate against their 
male children on the education provided. Fortunately, such education discrimination against 
male children seems to have been decreasing. 
 
Gender discrimination on education within poor families can be estimated by adding the 
coefficients of gender and the interaction between poor and gender for the case of urban 
families and by adding the coefficients of gender, the interaction between poor and gender, 
and the interaction between rural and gender for the case of rural families (table 6).  It is 
generally believed that girls within poor families, especially in the rural areas, are relatively 
more discriminated against. For example, Oportunidades (formerly Progresa), the Mexican 
government assistance program, is intended to alleviate discrimination against girls in the 
poor families by offering larger monetary transfers to families with girls attending school. 
However, contrary to our findings for non-poor families, we did not find enough evidence 
to claim that poor families, both in rural and urban areas, discriminate on the education 
given to their male or female children in any of the years of the period under study.  It is 
noteworthy that discrimination against girls is not even evident in 1992, before 
Oportunidades was created. The lack of evidence supporting gender bias against female 
children on education suggests the need for a review of assistance programs favoring the 
investment in human capital for girls and their impact on a possible education gender gap. 
 
Children in the rural areas used to achieve less years of schooling than children in the urban 
areas. However, in the 2004 regressions, the coefficient of the variable rural (for girls) and 
the sum of the coefficients of the variables rural and gender x rural (for boys) became 
statistically equal to zero (except for girls in the random effects regression). In 2004, rural 
and urban children get, on average, the same years of schooling (table 6).  
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Poor children complete less years of schooling than non-poor children. In both models and 
in all years poor girls are about 0.7 years less educated than the non-poor ones (reading the 
coefficient of the variable poor). Similarly, poor boys are about 0.45 years less educated 
than the non-poor ones (reading the sum of the coefficients of the variables poor and 
gender x poor) (table 6).  
 
The education level and the gender of the head of the household are also related to the 
education attainment of children. Female and more educated head of households are more 
likely to have children with higher levels of schooling. Children having both parents at 
home or having older brothers or sisters present also higher levels of schooling. Parish and 
Willis (1993) found this last result in his study for Taiwan and describe that family credit 
constraints, when all children are young, force the older ones to leave school and help with 
the family income. However, we found that, the larger the family size the fewer years of 
education a child will have. 
 
The coefficients of the variable age can not be interpreted in this regression but it was 
introduced to control for the fact that older children have more years of schooling. The 
variable hours worked was introduced to the model to check whether children leave school 
to work. We found a negative and significant relation between hours worked and schooling 
but the coefficient estimate of the gender variable was only modestly modified when we 
introduced hours worked to the model. Finally, we included 31 state dummies to control for 
cultural differences among the regions of the country. 
 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
There is considerable evidence that resources are not allocated randomly within 
households, and that resources are unequally distributed within the family in many 
developing countries.  Such an unequal distribution of goods usually takes the form of a 
bias against females. For example, girls lag markedly behind boys in schooling in many 
developing countries even though this gender gap has been declining in recent years. 
 
For the case of Mexico, it is generally believed that girls -more specifically poor rural girls- 
are educationally discriminated against within their families. It is also claimed that 15 of 
every 100 parents do not invest on the education of their daughters because they think girls 
will get married and, therefore, investing in their education will be a waste of money. 
Furthermore, government efforts to abate poverty have been recently focused on decreasing 
the “assumed” discrimination against female children. The government assistance program 
Oportunidades (formerly Progresa) gives monetary transfers to poor families conditioned 
on having their children attending school and health clinics. Intended to reduce such 
“assumed” discrimination against girls, transfers are larger for girls than for boys. We did 
not find enough evidence to support such believes. Using an OLS-Robust model and a ML-
Random Effects model for the years 1992, 1998 and 2004, we did not find enough 
statistical evidence to support the idea that poor families, nether in rural nor in urban areas, 
provide more education to their 12 to 18 years old sons or daughters. In fact, contrary to the 
general belief, we found that non-poor families, as established by the Mexican Technical 
Committee for Measuring Poverty (2002), invest more in the education of their daughters, 
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especially in the urban areas. Fortunately, this education differences have been decreasing 
over the years.  
 
We also found that female head of households are more likely to have children with higher 
levels of schooling and that children having both parents at home or having older brothers 
or sisters present higher levels of educational attainment. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. OLS Robust and Random Effect Models: 1992, 1998, 2004 
 
educationa
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
gender -0.3564 0.0773 ** -0.3382 0.0507 ** -0.3003 0.0717 ** -0.2646 0.0613 ** -0.1654 0.0695 ** -0.1458 0.0426 **
rural -0.7123 0.1252 ** -0.7190 0.0742 ** -0.5807 0.1146 ** -0.5554 0.0836 ** 0.1794 0.1245 0.1294 0.0619 **
gender x rural -0.0282 0.1339 -0.0752 0.0856 0.1709 0.1569 0.1590 0.0978 * -0.1137 0.1608 -0.1047 0.0719
head gender -0.0853 0.1353 -0.0723 0.1093 -0.5509 0.1467 ** -0.5141 0.1067 ** -0.1346 0.1396 -0.1262 0.0924
head educationa 0.1334 0.0100 ** 0.1313 0.0068 ** 0.1502 0.0082 ** 0.1483 0.0068 ** 0.0997 0.0091 ** 0.0983 0.0050 **
child order 0.0574 0.0319 * 0.0487 0.0195 ** 0.0871 0.0325 ** 0.0880 0.0235 ** -0.0149 0.0475 0.0146 0.0196
no. of children -0.1223 0.0250 ** -0.1180 0.0154 ** -0.1149 0.0278 ** -0.1045 0.0177 -0.1431 0.0402 ** -0.1355 0.0155 **
poorb -0.6311 0.1118 ** -0.6725 0.0702 ** -0.4907 0.1042 ** -0.5389 0.0778 ** -0.6092 0.1084 ** -0.6034 0.0604 **
gender x poor 0.2422 0.1295 * 0.3255 0.0803 ** 0.2007 0.1344 0.1925 0.0900 ** 0.2538 0.1505 * 0.2109 0.0691 **
both parents 0.2729 0.1479 * 0.2383 0.1165 ** 0.6839 0.1753 ** 0.6566 0.1156 ** 0.3196 0.1430 * 0.3043 0.0951 **
age 0.5861 0.0178 ** 0.5751 0.0106 ** 0.5526 0.0157 ** 0.5513 0.0112 ** 0.7278 0.0234 ** 0.7166 0.0089 **
hours worked -0.0145 0.0020 ** -0.0121 0.0011 ** -0.0088 0.0048 * -0.0087 0.0026 ** -0.0219 0.0029 ** -0.0189 0.0011 **
: : : : : : : : : : : : :
state dummies : : : : : : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : : : : : : :
constant -1.8711 0.3651 ** -1.7145 0.2719 ** -1.1291 0.3144 ** -1.1560 0.2971 ** -2.7095 0.4575 ** -2.5970 0.2276 **
sigma_u 1.0251 0.0261 1.0583 0.0299 1.1065 0.0210
sigma_e 1.4019 0.0162 1.4965 0.0190 1.3991 0.0142
rho 0.3484 0.0147 0.3334 0.0161 0.3848 0.0120
R^2
F or LR-Chi2 ** ** ** ** ** **
observations
groups
6930
11,109
7,176
3420
6,871
4,040
0.43
75.54
11,109
4,119
0.40
72.10
6,871
0.46
79.57
7,623
4426
7,623
1992
OLS-Robust Random Effects OLS-Robust OLS-Robust Random Effects
1998 2004
Random Effects
 
 
a) years of education;  b)   less than 1,615 pesos of 2002 per capita for rural households and less than 2,170 pesos for urban households 
**) 95% significant; *) 90% significant. 
The sample includes boys and girls between 12 and 18 years old living with at least one of their parents.   
Source: own estimations with data from ENIGH 1992, 1998 and 2004.  
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Table 6. OLS Robust and Random Effect Models: Coefficient Interactions 
 
 
educationa
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
non-poor urban 
families -0.3564 0.0773 ** -0.3382 0.0507 ** -0.3003 0.0717 ** -0.2646 0.0613 ** -0.1654 0.0695 ** -0.1458 0.0426 **
non-poor rural 
families -0.3847 0.1283 ** -0.4134 0.0839 ** -0.1294 0.1669 -0.1056 0.1024 -0.2791 0.1640 * -0.2505 0.0687 **
poor urban 
families -0.1142 0.1192 -0.0127 0.0726 -0.0995 0.1173 -0.0721 0.0755 0.0883 0.1408 0.0651 0.0633
poor rural 
families -0.1424 0.1243 -0.0879 0.0794 0.0713 0.1269 0.0869 0.0798 -0.0254 0.1485 -0.0396 0.0691
rural vs. urban 
(girls) -0.7123 0.1252 ** -0.7190 0.0742 ** -0.5807 0.1146 ** -0.5554 0.0836 ** 0.1794 0.1245 0.1294 0.0619 *
rural vs. urban 
(boys) -0.7405 0.1109 ** -0.7942 0.0728 ** -0.4098 0.1227 ** -0.3964 0.0812 ** 0.0657 0.1506 0.0248 0.0603
poor vs. non-poor 
(girls) -0.6311 0.1118 ** -0.6725 0.0702 ** -0.4907 0.1042 ** -0.5389 0.0778 ** -0.6092 0.1084 ** -0.6034 0.0604 **
poor vs. non-poor 
(boys) -0.3889 0.1095 ** -0.3470 0.0700 ** -0.2900 0.1192 ** -0.3464 0.0753 ** -0.3555 0.1303 ** -0.3925 0.0591 **
OLS-Robust Random EffectsOLS-Robust Random Effects OLS-Robust Random Effects
1992 1998 2004
a) years of education 
**) 95% significant; *) 90% significant. 
The sample includes boys and girls between 12 and 18 years old living with at least one of their parents.   
 
Source: own estimations with data from ENIGH 1992, 1998 and 2004.  
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